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Abstract 
The self has fascinated scholars for centuries. Although theory suggests that the self-
concept (cognitive self-understanding) and bodily self (pre-reflective awareness of one’s body) 
are related, little work has examined this notion. To this end, in Study 1, participants reported on 
self-concept clarity (SCC) and completed the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), a paradigm in which 
synchronous (versus asynchronous) stimulation between a prosthetic hand and one’s own hand 
leads one to “embody” the prosthetic hand. Whereas participants were equally susceptible to the 
RHI during synchronous stroking, low SCC individuals were more vulnerable to the illusion 
during asynchronous stroking, when the effect is unwarranted. Conceptually replicating and 
extending this finding, in Study 2, low SCC individuals were more susceptible to the body-swap 
illusion—the impression that another person’s body is one’s own. These findings suggest that a 
clear sense of self implies clarity and stability of both the self-concept and the bodily self.  
Keywords: self, self-concept, rubber hand illusion, multisensory integration processes  
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Self-Concept Clarity and the Bodily Self: 
Malleability Across Modalities 
Where does our sense of self come from? How do we maintain a clear and stable sense of 
self? Beginning with William James (1890), philosophers and psychologists have defined and 
studied the self in different ways to understand these fundamental questions (Gallagher, 2000; 
Neisser, 1997). Personality and social psychologists have largely focused on the self-concept. 
Essentially, the self-concept—the cognitive generalization of one’s self-knowledge and self-
beliefs based on past experiences—encompasses everything that an individual claims as “me” or 
“mine”: personality attributes, values, attitudes, beliefs, preferences, goals, emotional states, 
social roles, and even physical appearance (Markus, 1977). Researchers conceptualizing the self 
in this way have shown that people are generally motivated to maintain a stable self-concept: that 
is, people are resistant to information that is incongruent with their self-views and often reject 
feedback that is inconsistent with their notion of self (Swann & Read, 1981a; 1981b). That said, 
it is also well-established that the self-concept is dynamic and subject to change, especially in 
response to changes in the social environment or social roles (Markus & Wurf, 1987). For 
example, research indicates that the self-concept is likely to change during life transitions, such 
as going to university or becoming a parent (Kling, Ryff, & Essex, 1997), or in close 
relationships, as people readily incorporate close others into their sense of self (e.g., Aron, Aron, 
Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Mashek, Aron, & Boncimino, 2003). In the face of these changes, it is 
thought that the self-concept integrates new information and experiences with existing self-
knowledge allowing individuals to organize the new and old together to maintain a consistent 
and stable sense of self (Markus, 1977). 
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Individuals, of course, vary in their ability to establish a consistent and stable sense of 
self; such variability has been conceptualized as self-concept clarity (SCC)—i.e., the extent to 
which the self-concept is clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and temporally 
stable (Campbell et al., 1996). Over two decades of research has established the internal, 
external, and discriminant validity of SCC (Lodi-Smith & DeMarree, 2017). For example, 
individuals with lower self-reported SCC show lower levels of self–other agreement in 
personality ratings and lower accuracy in predicting their own behaviour, suggesting that they 
“know” themselves less well than do those who report higher SCC (Lewandowski & Nardone, 
2012). In addition to having a less clear and confidently-defined self-concept, individuals with 
low SCC are characterized by a less stable and more malleable self-concept. It is thought that 
with no clear “self” to draw upon, these individuals are more prone to incorporating new, and 
potentially conflicting, information into their self-understanding. Supporting this idea, Cuperman 
and colleagues (2014) showed that people with a weak sense of self were more likely to accept 
false, generic personality descriptions as characteristic of the self, and they were more prone to 
temporarily taking on the personality characteristics of a stranger following a brief interaction. 
Similarly, Smeesters et al. (2009) found that individuals with less accessible self-knowledge 
(presumably related to having a weak and unclear self-concept) were more susceptible to 
priming effects than individuals with highly accessible self-knowledge. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that those with low SCC are characterized by more malleable cognitive self 
representations.  
 While personality and social psychologists have focused on the self-concept, for decades, 
cognitive psychologists and philosophers of mind have addressed questions about the self by 
studying the bodily self, also known as “bodily self-consciousness” (e.g., Lenggenhager, Tadi, 
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Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007) and “body schema” (e.g., Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996). The bodily 
self can be defined as the implicit, pre-reflective awareness of the perceptual experiences of 
one’s body in space (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996; Haggard & Wolpert, 2005) 
and is thought to  rely  on multisensory integration processes that are responsible for assimilating 
various sensory signals (e.g., visual, vestibular, auditory, tactile, proprioceptive) and resolving 
conflicts to generate a coherent representation of the body (Ehrsson, 2012; Kilteni, Maselli, 
Kording, & Slater, 2015). Of note, the bodily self is different from body image, which reflects 
the conscious perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs one has about one’s body (Gallagher & Meltzoff, 
1996).   Importantly, the bodily self is thought to come online earlier in development than the 
self-concept. Developmental studies show that newborns less than an hour old can imitate facial 
gestures (e.g., Meltzoff & Moore, 1983), an ability thought to rely on the presence of a 
representation of one’s body (Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996). By contrast, the self-concept is 
thought to emerge in the second year of life (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002). This 
sequential emergence of these two notions of self is in line with the long-held understanding that 
the bodily self serves as the foundation for the development of the self-concept. As Freud (1961, 
p. 26) noted, “the ego is first and foremost a bodily ego” and, similarly, as Baumeister (1992, p. 
2) wrote, “everywhere in the world, self starts with body”. In sum, the self-concept and bodily 
self represents different perspectives on the self and research to date indicates that these two 
notions of self rely on different psychological processes and come online at different stages 
during development. 
 Intriguingly, as with the self-concept, our bodily self is somewhat malleable. The most 
famous and well-established empirical demonstration of this malleability is the Rubber Hand 
Illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In this illusion, participants are seated at a table with a 
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life-like, prosthetic hand placed directly in front of them and with their own hand positioned on 
the table, next to the prosthetic hand, but hidden from view. The experimenter strokes both the 
visible prosthetic hand and the real hidden hand, using identical paintbrushes. Synchronous 
stroking between the prosthetic hand and a participant’s hand causes the participant to 
experience the prosthetic hand as part of his or her own body (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Longo, 
Schüür, Kammers, Tsakiris, & Haggard, 2008). Interestingly, research indicates that the 
experience of “owning” the prosthetic changes the way participants’ own real hand is 
experienced. During the illusion, participants report feeling as if their real hand has 
“disappeared” (Longo et al., 2008), suggesting that the prosthetic hand has replaced the real hand 
in the body representation. Several studies have demonstrated that the RHI also induces a mis-
localization of one’s own real hand as being closer to the prosthetic hand than it really is 
(Abdulkarim & Ehrsson, 2016; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). 
Remarkably, the RHI also induces physiological changes indicating that participants experience 
their real hand differently. Bending one of the prosthetic fingers backward (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003) or stabbing a needle into it (Ehrsson et al., 2008; Petkova & Ehrsson, 
2009) produces a heightened skin conductance response, indicative of autonomic reactivity, 
suggesting that participants are reacting as if their real hand were threatened. Taken together, 
psychological, behavioural and physiological evidence indicate that owning the prosthetic hand 
changes the way one’s own real hand is experienced.  
The RHI is thought to rely on the same multisensory integration processes responsible for 
generating the bodily self noted earlier. The illusion occurs as a result of the interaction between 
vision, touch, and proprioception (the sense of position of one’s body parts) and the dominance 
of vision over proprioception. The vision of tactile stimulation on the prosthetic hand and the 
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matching touch felt on the real hand become bound together in a single event; this then causes 
participants to misperceive the visible prosthetic hand as being part of their own body (Botvinick 
& Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris, 2010). Indeed, these multisensory integration processes are so strong 
and automatic that the vast majority of participants report strongly experiencing the prosthetic 
hand as their own (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004; Ehrsson, 
Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Lloyd, 2007). Importantly, though, asynchronous stroking—that 
is, when the prosthetic hand and the participant’s own hand are stroked out of phase—typically 
elicits a weaker illusion or none at all since there is no sensory conflict between visual and tactile 
inputs to be resolved (Shimada, Fukuda, & Hiraki, 2009; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005).  
Recently, the malleability of the bodily self evidenced in the RHI has been extended to 
other bodily illusions using similar synchronous multisensory stimulation techniques. In the 
enfacement illusion, synchronous stroking between a participant’s face and another person’s face 
induces changes in self-recognition such that the other’s facial features are incorporated into the 
participant’s own facial representation (Sforza, Bufalari, Haggard, & Aglioti, 2010; Tajadura-
Jiménez, Grehl, & Tsakiris, 2012). Other work suggests that this malleability can be extended 
from individual body parts, like the hand and face, to the entire body. For example, out-of-body 
experiences can be induced by having participants observe a virtual avatar in front of them, 
outside of their personal space (i.e., third-person perspective), as it is stroked in synchrony with 
their own body (Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007; see Ehrsson, 2007 for 
induction of out-of-body experiences using a different method). Building on this finding, 
Petkova and Ehrsson (2008) were the first to induce illusory ownership over an actual person’s 
body (i.e., not a virtual avatar): in the “body-swap” illusion, participants see another person’s 
body from the first-person perspective via a head-mounted display and are subjected to 
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synchronized visuo-tactile stimulation with this person. This illusion, like the RHI, induces 
people to experience the other person’s body as if it were their own. Indeed, this illusion is so 
robust that even standing across from and shaking hands with what appears to be one’s own body 
(but is actually the other person’s body) does not break the illusion (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). 
Taken together, the psychological self-concept and bodily self offer two approaches to 
understanding the self. Although clearly different from one another, theory suggests that these 
two notions of self are related (Gallagher, 2000); to date, however, we know of only a few 
studies that have touched on this issue. In one study, Banakou, Groten, and Slater (2013) induced 
illusory body ownership of a virtual child which increased participants’ endorsement of child-
like, rather than adult-like, attributes. This study suggests that the content of the self-concept is 
reliant on owning a specific body. In another study, Bergouignan, Nyberg, and Ehrsson (2014) 
showed that disruption of the bodily self through the inducement of an out-of-body experience 
led to interference with encoding of episodic memories, a process critical for the formation and 
maintenance of the self-concept (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Schacter, Chiao, & Mitchell, 
2003). Finally, Ainley, Maister, Brokfeld, Farmer, and Tsakiris (2013) showed that focusing 
attention on self-relevant aspects (e.g., hometown) improved awareness of internal bodily signals 
such as heartbeat. These studies provide initial evidence that the self-concept and bodily self are 
indeed related. As noted, one fundamental aspect of the self-concept is its relative clarity and 
stability (i.e., SCC).  If the self-concept and the bodily self are related, then one would expect 
that malleability in the self-concept implies malleability in the bodily self. Such a finding would 
contribute to our understanding of the self by indicating that a clear and coherent sense of self 
entails clarity and coherence of both the self-concept and the bodily self.  
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To this end, we conducted two studies to test whether individuals with a less clear, 
coherent, and stable self-concept are characterized by a more malleable bodily self.  In Study 1, 
participants self-reported on their SCC and then underwent the RHI in which they experienced 
both synchronous and asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation with a prosthetic hand. As noted, in 
the synchronous condition, multisensory integration processes are sufficiently strong and 
automatic that most people are susceptible to experiencing the illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004;  Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Lloyd, 
2007). Thus, we predicted that overall participants would be more susceptible to “embodying” 
the prosthetic hand in the synchronous (vs. asynchronous) stroking conditions, as has been 
shown in prior work. However, we hypothesized that those low (vs. high) in SCC would be more 
susceptible to experiencing the illusion in the asynchronous stimulation condition, which 
typically does not elicit the illusion. Given that their sense of self is so tenuous and unclear, and 
that they are prone to incorporating any random, new information into their self-concept 
(Cuperman et al., 2014), we reasoned that individuals low in SCC would be more vulnerable to 
embodying the prosthetic hand even under inappropriate circumstances, when there is no sensory 
conflict to be resolved by multisensory integration. In Study 2, we aimed to conceptually 
replicate and extend our understanding of this effect by examining whether SCC is related to 
illusory body ownership using the body-swap illusion.  
To assess malleability of the bodily self in Studies 1 and 2, we used the embodiment 
questionnaire (Longo et al., 2008), an instrument used to assess susceptibility to the RHI.  Of 
note, although embodiment is often conceptualized as a unitary experience, research indicates 
that it can be broken down into three sub-components reflecting specific aspects of embodiment: 
ownership, location, and agency (Longo et al., 2008). We did not have a priori predictions about 
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the relationship between SCC and these specific sub-components so we report our findings using 
the full scale. However, for the interested reader, we conducted exploratory analyses with these 
sub-components as the dependent variable to assess whether the effects we report in Studies 1 
and 2 are specific to certain aspects of the illusion; results from these exploratory analyses are 
detailed in the Supplementary Materials. 
Study 1 
Methods 
Participants 
We recruited 80 individuals (55 women, 1 whose gender was unreported) from the 
McGill University community to participate. Participants ranged in age from 18-34 years (M = 
23.04, SD = 3.76). The procedures were approved by the McGill University Institutional Review 
Board and participants were compensated with either course credit or $10/hour.  
Our sample size was determined based on prior studies that have observed individual 
difference effects on susceptibility to the RHI with samples of approximately 70 participants 
(e.g., Asai, Mao, Sugimori, & Tanno, 2011; Marotta, Tinazzi, Cavedini, Zampini, & Fiorio, 
2016). We did not conduct an a priori power analysis; however, a post-hoc sensitivity power 
analysis indicated that our sample size of N=80 was sensitive to detect correlations of r=.31, 
representing a moderate effect (Cohen, 1988), with 80% power. 
Procedure 
After giving informed consent, participants completed the Self-Concept Clarity scale 
(Campbell et al., 1996). They were then randomly assigned to either the synchronous or 
asynchronous condition of the RHI (condition order was counterbalanced). After the illusion, 
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they completed the aforementioned questionnaire developed by Longo and colleagues (2008), 
which quantifies the subjective experience of the RHI. Approximately 20-mins later, after 
completing tasks unrelated to the current hypotheses, participants underwent the RHI again, with 
the alternate stroking style. Participants were debriefed upon completion of the study. 
Tasks and Measures 
Self-Concept Clarity scale (Campbell et al., 1996). This is a 12-item self-report measure 
of the extent to which one’s self-concept is clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, 
and stable. Participants indicate their agreement to each item using a five-point Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). The majority of the items are 
reverse coded, such as “My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another” and “My 
beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently”. After reverse coding, SCC is 
operationalized as the mean of all items, with higher numbers indicating greater SCC (ω = .91). 
Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). Participants sat in front of a table 
with their right hand, palm down, placed in front of them in a box frame. A realistic prosthetic 
hand was shown to the participants and then positioned approximately 15 cm to the left of the 
participant’s own hand, outside of the box frame. Thus, the participant’s hand was hidden from 
view while the prosthetic hand was visible. Given evidence that differences between the skin 
colour of the prosthetic hand and the participant’s hand affect the strength of the RHI (Farmer, 
Tajadura-Jiménez, & Tsakiris, 2012; Lira et al., 2017), we followed Kalckert and Ehrsson (2012) 
and covered both hands with a latex glove. Once the hands were in position, the experimenter sat 
in front of the participant and manually stimulated the visible prosthetic hand and the 
participant’s unseen hand using two identical paintbrushes. Participants were stimulated on their 
second, third, and fourth fingers (index, middle, and ring fingers) from the proximal 
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interphalangeal joint (second knuckle) to the tip of the finger, at a rate of approximately 1 stroke 
per second. The prosthetic hand was stimulated in the same manner, either in synchrony or 
asynchrony with the stimulation of the participant’s hand. In the synchronous condition, the 
participant’s hand and the rubber hand were stroked simultaneously in the same anatomical 
location with each stroke lasting approximately 1 second. In the asynchronous condition, the 
brush strokes on the participant’s hand and prosthetic hand were temporally out of sync. 
Specifically, timing was delayed by approximately 500 ms such that a stroke was delivered to the 
real hand followed by a stroke to the prosthetic hand on the same anatomical location, but 500 
ms later. In both conditions, participants were instructed to keep their own hand still and to focus 
on the prosthetic hand. Consistent with other work, stroking lasted for 2-mins in each condition 
(e.g., Asai, Mao, Sugimori, & Tanno, 2011; Maister, Sebanz, Knoblich, & Tsakiris, 2013; 
Tsakiris, Jiménez, & Costantini, 2011). 
Embodiment of the Rubber Hand Questionnaire (Longo et al., 2008). To assess the extent 
to which participants incorporated the prosthetic hand into their bodily self, we used the 10-item 
“embodiment of rubber hand” factor identified by Longo and colleagues (2008), which was 
previously used to quantify the subjective experience of the RHI (Bassolino et al., 2018;   
Grynberg & Pollatos, 2015). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed 
with each item, using a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree). Example 
items include: “During the experiment, there were times when it seemed like the rubber hand 
belonged to me” and “During the experiment, there were times when it seemed like the rubber 
hand was my hand” (see Table S1 for questionnaire). Consistent with other work (e.g., Tsakiris, 
2010; Eshkevari, Rieger, Longo, Haggard, & Treasure, 2012), degree of embodiment was 
operationalized as the mean of all items (synchronous: ω = .95; asynchronous: ω = .93).  
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Results and Discussion 
As noted, we hypothesized that overall participants would embody the prosthetic hand 
more in the synchronous (vs. asynchronous) stroking condition, but that those low (vs. high) in 
SCC would also be more susceptible to embodying the prosthetic hand in the asynchronous 
stimulation condition, which typically does not elicit the illusion, because their sense of self is so 
tenuous and unclear.  
First, to verify that we successfully induced the illusion in the synchronous stroking 
condition, we compared the medians on two keys items of the embodiment questionnaire (items 
4 and 8, see Table S1), following Kalckert and Ehrsson (2014; also see Botvinick & Cohen, 
1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Lloyd, 2007). Results showed that, on average, participants 
experienced the prosthetic hand as their own hand after synchronous stroking (median = 5) but 
not after asynchronous stroking (median = 2); similarly, participants attributed the touch they felt 
to the stroking of the prosthetic hand in the synchronous condition (median = 5) but not in the 
asynchronous condition (median = 2). A Wilcoxon signed rank test showed that these medians 
were significantly different (z = -5.91 and z = -4.96 respectively, ps < 0.001) indicating that we 
successfully induced the RHI in the synchronous stroking condition. 
To test our main hypothesis, we conducted a marginal multilevel model analysis in SPSS 
(version 22), employing restricted maximum likelihood criteria. Specifically, we entered SCC 
(mean-centered across all participants), stimulation condition (repeated measures factor) and 
their interaction as predictors of embodiment. We included the interaction between SCC and 
condition as this enabled us to examine the effect of SCC on embodiment in the asynchronous 
condition while also including the synchronous condition in the model. Because our main 
hypothesis was about asynchronous stroking, we dummy-coded stimulation condition so that the 
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asynchronous condition was the reference category (i.e., asynchronous = 0); thus, the intercept in 
the model represents the degree of embodiment for the average person in the asynchronous 
condition. Due to the presence of the interaction term, the coefficient for SCC in our model 
represents the effect of SCC on embodiment during asynchronous stroking—the key test of our 
main hypothesis about SCC. 
Results showed a significant effect of stimulation condition, b = 1.25, t(78) = 7.94, p < 
.001, 95% CI [0.93, 1.56], indicating that participants were more likely to embody the prosthetic 
hand in the synchronous (vs. asynchronous) stimulation condition, consistent with the Wilcoxon 
signed rank test and prior research (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 
2004;  Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005; Lloyd, 2007). Critically, as predicted, results 
revealed a significant effect of SCC, b = –0.34, t(78) = –2.32, p = .023, 95% CI [–0.64, –0.05], 
indicating that people with an unclear and unstable sense of self were more likely to embody the 
prosthetic in the asynchronous stroking condition, when the effect is unwarranted. Finally, 
results showed no significant interaction between SCC and condition (b = 0.21, t(78) = 1.25, p = 
.214, 95% CI [–0.13, 0.55]). Although we had no predictions about the interaction, this result 
suggests that the association between SCC and embodiment was similar in the two conditions. 
For the sake of completeness, we examined the effect of SCC in the synchronous condition; the 
direction of the effect was the same as in the asynchronous condition, with those lower in SCC 
being more likely to embody the prosthetic hand, but the effect of SCC on embodiment in the 
synchronous condition was not significant (b = –0.13, t(78) = –0.65, p = .52, 95% CI [–0.52, 
0.27]). We suspect that this null effect is likely because of the robustness of the RHI. That is, 
during synchronous stroking, most people—both those low and high in SCC—experience a 
strong RHI. Results are summarized in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1. 
SELF-CONCEPT CLARITY AND BODY ILLUSIONS 15 
Table 1. Results of multilevel model analysis predicting embodiment of the prosthetic hand. 
Predictor b 95% Confidence Interval  t(78) 
Intercept 2.59*** 2.33, 2.86  19.50 
Stimulation condition 1.25*** 0.93, 1.56  7.94 
SCC  –0.34* –0.64, –0.05  –2.32 
SCC × Stimulation Condition 0.21 –0.13, 0.55  1.25 
     *p<.05; ***p<.001 
 
 
Figure 1. The relationship between self-concept clarity and embodiment. Self-concept clarity 
significantly predicts embodiment of the prosthetic hand in the asynchronous stimulation 
condition. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence bands. 
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Study 2 
 In Study 1, we showed that low SCC is associated with greater susceptibility to the RHI 
when there is no sensory conflict between visual and tactile inputs to be resolved, suggesting that 
individuals who have an unclear sense of self also have a more malleable bodily self. The RHI, 
however, involves experiencing illusory ownership over a single body part (i.e., a hand) and 
hence assesses malleability of body-part ownership, rather than malleability of whole-body 
ownership. Given that the bodily self is experienced as a single, coherent whole-body 
representation, rather than the sum of multiple representations of separate body parts (Metzinger, 
2004), assessing susceptibility to whole-body ownership would more completely capture 
malleability of the bodily self. To address this, in Study 2, we sought to conceptually replicate 
and extend our findings by testing if low SCC people are also more vulnerable to the body-swap 
illusion, that is, the impression that one possesses another person’s entire body (Petkova & 
Ehrsson, 2008). To this end, we took advantage of a study investigating whether experiencing 
the body-swap illusion with a different race target reduces prejudice (Thériault et al., in 
preparation). Specifically, participants in the body-swap condition were outfitted with a virtual-
reality head-mounted display, which gave them a first-person perspective from the body of 
another person—an important determinant of body ownership (Ehrsson, 2007). The body-swap 
illusion was elicited by instructing participants to execute a series of movements in synchrony 
with the other person. Based on our findings in Study 1, we predicted that those low in SCC 
would be more susceptible to the body-swap illusion.  
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Methods 
Participants  
As noted, for Study 2, we drew upon a larger study examining the effects of different 
perspective-taking manipulations on racism toward Black individuals (Thériault et al., in 
preparation). Specifically, we analyzed data from the 34 participants randomly assigned to the 
body-swap condition. There were 25 women and nine men; participants ranged in age from 18-
31 years old (M = 22.26, SD = 3.35). Of note, although the larger study analyzed only non-Black 
participants, two participants in the body–swap condition were Black; because we did not have 
specific predictions about race, we elected to include these participants (although the pattern of 
results reported below does not change if these participants are excluded). The procedures were 
approved by the Integrated Health and Social Services University Network for West-Central 
Montreal Institutional Review Board and participants were compensated $20.  
Because we drew upon an existing dataset we could not base our sample size on our 
effect of interest; however, results from a post-hoc sensitivity power analysis indicate that this 
sample size was sensitive to detect correlations of r=.45 with 80% power. Given that this 
correlation represents a moderate to large effect (Cohen, 1988), this estimate suggests that our 
study was well-powered to test the association between SCC and susceptibility to the body-swap 
illusion. 
Procedure 
The experimenter first met participants and a gender-matched Black confederate at the 
building lobby and guided them to the testing location. Participants were informed that they 
would be participating in a study examining the influence of immersive virtual technology and 
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embodiment on social cognition (i.e., they were not explicitly told that they would be seeing the 
confederate’s perspective through a headset). After giving their informed consent, participants 
and the confederate were instructed to sit on one of two chairs and to put on the virtual reality 
headset (see below for details). Through the headset, participants received visual input from a 
camera attached to the head of the confederate (and vice versa for the confederate). That is, 
looking down at their hands or at the mirror in front of them, participants would see the hands or 
the reflection of the confederate, rather than their own hands or reflection (see Figure 2). Once 
the participant and the confederate were wearing the virtual reality headsets, the experimenter 
read a script giving them instructions to execute a series of movements in order to begin the 
body-swap induction. Importantly, participants were told that they had been randomly assigned 
to the “follower” role while the confederate had been assigned to the “leader” role (in fact, 
participants were always assigned to the “follower” role). The leader’s role was to follow the 
experimenter’s instructions, and the follower’s role was to synchronize their movements as much 
as possible with those of the leader. In this way, participants saw the confederate executing 
movements from a first-hand perspective via the headset as they themselves executed the same 
movements. After approximately 5 minutes, participants were instructed to close their eyes so 
that the curtains hiding the mirrors could be removed. Once the curtains were removed, 
participants opened their eyes and were instructed: “For the next minute, look at yourself in the 
mirror in front of you”. This was done to strengthen the illusion that the confederate’s body 
belonged to the participant (Preston, Kuper-Smith, & Ehrsson, 2015). The experimenter then 
continued with the movement instructions. The body-swapping induction lasted approximately 
10 minutes. After this induction, participants completed a self-report measure of embodiment, 
various tasks and measures unrelated to the current investigation, as well as the Self-Concept 
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Clarity scale (ω = .93) used in Study 1. Finally, participants were partially debriefed and 
compensated for their time, and then fully debriefed at a later time. For full procedural details, 
see (Citation Blinded).  
Experimental Setup 
Participants sat on a chair facing a large partition that separated the testing area, 
approximately 125 cm from the partition. In a parallel setup, the confederate sat on the other side 
of the partition such that the participant and the confederate could not see each other. Directly in 
front of the participant and the confederate, against the partition, was a large mirror (74 cm × 165 
cm) covered by a black curtain. The experimenter stood to the right of the participant (left of the 
confederate) as they delivered the instructions through a headset microphone. A speaker to the 
left of the participant also transmitted the voice of the experimenter so that the instructions 
appeared to come from both sides of the participant. This was important to maintain the illusion 
of body-swapping; otherwise, the participant would see the experimenter on their left during the 
illusion but hear their voice from the right.  
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Figure 2.  Experimental setup with large partition separating confederate and participant. Left: 
Confederate looking down at her hands.  Middle: Participant point of view (through the virtual-
reality headset), seeing the confederate’s hands and image reflection, instead of her own.  Right: 
Participant looking down at her hands. 
 
Materials and Measures 
 Virtual Reality Headset. We used the Oculus Rift Development Kit 2 head-mounted 
display. Two small screens are located inside, with resolutions of 960 × 1080 pixels per eye and 
a refresh rate of 75 frames per second, resulting in horizontal and vertical fields of view of 
approximately 100° of visual angle. To allow participants to see the person’s visual perspective, 
we attached a modified PlayStation 3 camera to the Oculus Rift device using a custom 3D 
printed structure. The software used to generate the body-swap illusion is called The Machine to 
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Be Another, developed by the international and interdisciplinary collective BeAnotherLab 
(Bertrand, Gonzalez-Franco, Cherene, & Pointeau, 2014)1.  
Body-Swap Embodiment Questionnaire (ω = .91). To assess the degree to which 
participants experienced the body-swap illusion, we adapted the Longo et al. (2008) embodiment 
questionnaire used in Study 1. Specifically, using an 8-point scale, participants indicated their 
level of agreement with 10 items assessing the extent to which they experienced the 
confederate’s body as their own (0 = I do not agree at all and 7 = I agree completely). Sample 
items include: “It seemed like the body I saw belonged to me” and “It seemed like the body I 
saw was my body” (see Table S2 for questionnaire). The strength of the body-swap illusion was 
operationalized as the mean of all items relating to embodiment, with higher scores indicating a 
stronger illusion that the confederate’s body belonged to the participant. 
Results and Discussion 
 To test the hypothesis that those low in SCC are more vulnerable to the body-swap 
illusion, we conducted a linear regression in R version 3.5.1 with SCC predicting embodiment as 
assessed by our body-swap embodiment questionnaire. As predicted, and conceptually 
replicating findings from Study 1, SCC was negatively associated with the strength of the body-
swap illusion (b = –0.48, t(32) = –2.98, p = .006; 95% CI [-0.81, -0.15]). That is, as shown in 
Figure 3, individuals with an unclear sense of self reported experiencing the body-swap illusion 
more strongly than those with a more clear sense of self.  
 
 
1 This software is publicly available at: https://github.com/BeAnotherLab/The-Machine-to-be-Another.   
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General Discussion 
In the present studies, we examined the relationship between the self-concept, the 
cognitive representation of everything that can be described as “me” or “mine” (Markus, 1977), 
and the bodily self, the implicit, pre-reflective awareness of the perceptual experiences of one’s 
body in space (Gallagher, 2000; Gallagher & Meltzoff, 1996; Haggard & Wolpert, 2005). 
Specifically, we investigated whether clarity and stability in the self-concept is associated with 
clarity and stability in the bodily self. In Study 1, we used the RHI paradigm to assess whether 
Figure 3. The relationship between self-concept clarity and embodiment in the body-swap 
illusion. Self-concept clarity significantly predicts embodiment of the other person’s body. 
Shaded area represents 95% confidence band. 
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lower SCC individuals are more vulnerable to misperceiving sensory cues and incorporating that 
irrelevant information into their bodily self. As predicted, those low (vs. high) in SCC reported 
more embodiment of the prosthetic hand during asynchronous stroking—that is, the control 
condition which typically does not give rise to the illusion because there is less sensory conflict 
between what is “me” and “not me”. We suspect that low SCC individuals have such a tenuous 
and fragile sense of self that they incorporate the prosthetic hand into their own body 
representation even in this inappropriate context when sensory signals do not warrant it. 
Interestingly, a similar finding—susceptibility to the RHI under asynchronous stimulation—was 
observed in patients with schizophrenia (Thakkar, Nichols, McIntosh, & Park, 2011), a disorder 
characterized by disturbances in self-processing including self-concept confusion (for review, 
see Cicero, 2017). In Study 2, we conceptually replicate this effect by demonstrating that low 
SCC individuals are also more susceptible to the body-swap illusion—i.e., experiencing another 
person’s body as their own. This observation is notable given that the confederate in the body-
swap illusion was of a different race than almost all participants, a factor known to reliably 
decrease the strength of bodily illusions (Farmer et al., 2012; Lira et al., 2017). Taken together, 
our results show that a weak and unclear sense of self is associated with an excessively malleable 
bodily self. While previous work has observed an association between SCC and body image (i.e., 
lower SCC is related to greater body dissatisfaction; for review, see Vartanian & Hayward, 
2017), to our knowledge, this is the first evidence linking SCC to the bodily self. 
Our findings are correlational and an important question for future work is to test the 
causal relations between SCC and body malleability. Consistent with the notion that the self 
“starts with the body” (Baumeister, 1992), it is possible that our bodily self contributes to the 
clarity of our self-concept in a bottom-up fashion. Having a more malleable representation of 
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one’s own body may predispose one to question one’s psychological experience, which could 
ultimately lead to an unclear self-concept. In fact, as noted, developmentally, the bodily self 
comes online prior to the development of the self-concept or identity: infants exhibit evidence of 
bodily awareness as manifested by, for example, recognizing themselves in a mirror 
(Amsterdam, 1972; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979) before the development of a self-concept or 
personal identity (Damon & Hart, 1982; Stipek, Gralinski, & Kopp, 1990). Alternatively, having 
a weak and unclear sense of self may make people more susceptible to alterations in their bodily 
representations. This notion is consistent with findings showing that increasing  awareness of the 
self-concept translates to improved awareness of internal bodily signals such as heartbeat 
(Ainley, Maister, Brokfeld, Farmer, & Tsakiris; 2013). To examine if SCC plays a causal role in 
affecting our bodily self, researchers could experimentally manipulate SCC (e.g., Emery, Walsh, 
& Slotter, 2015) before exposing participants to a bodily illusion. A third possibility is that rather 
than being unidirectional, the self-concept and bodily self may interact in a dynamic reciprocal 
fashion to form a clear and coherent sense of self (Brandon, 2016).  For example, low SCC 
individuals’ proclivity to incorporate inappropriate and unwarranted bodily information into the 
self may lead to a vicious cycle by which self-concept confusion is maintained, or even 
exacerbated. Future research is needed to elucidate the precise nature of the relationship between 
SCC and body malleability. 
Our research may have important implications for interpersonal processes. Social 
interaction requires processing information about the other person’s internal state—their 
thoughts, feelings, motivations, attitudes. Interestingly, compelling evidence shows that 
processing others’ internal states activates the same neural representations as when the self 
experiences these internal states (Bernhardt & Singer, 2012; Gallagher et al., 2000). Such 
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“mirroring” can result in potential conflicts between representations of the other and the self, and 
thus successful social interaction requires self-other distinction: the ability to differentiate 
between one’s own experiences and the experiences of the other (see Guzman, Bird, Banissy, & 
Catmur, 2016 and Steinbeis, 2016 for reviews). For example, the control of our automatic 
tendency to imitate others requires the ability to distinguish between one’s own motor plan and 
that of the other (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Perspective-taking requires appreciating differences 
between one’s own mental state and that of the other to avoid simply attributing one’s own 
perspective to the other person, especially when the other’s perspective conflicts with one’s own 
(Santiesteban et al., 2012).  Finally, when empathizing with another, the degree of differentiation 
between the self and other may lead to qualitatively different empathic reactions. As Batson 
(1987) argued, failing to maintain adequate boundaries between one’s own emotions and those of 
another person can result in empathic personal distress, a self-oriented, aversive response that 
often detracts from helping the person in need (Batson, 1987). By contrast, empathic concern, an 
other-oriented response that induces a desire to alleviate the other’s suffering, is associated with 
greater self-other distinction (Batson et al., 1997). Low SCC individuals’ difficulties with bodily 
self–other distinction (i.e., excessively malleable bodily self) may predispose them to troubles 
with social processes such as the ones described above.  Future work could investigate this idea. 
This research may also have implications for understanding clinical conditions marked by 
difficulties with self-representations. In particular, our findings suggest that disorders 
characterized by disturbances in one aspect of the self may also be characterized by disturbances 
in other aspects of the self.  As noted, individuals with schizophrenia, like those with low SCC, 
are more susceptible to the RHI during asynchronous stroking (Thakkar et al., 2011); 
interestingly, schizophrenia has been shown to be related to low SCC (Cicero, 2017). Together, 
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these findings suggest that people with schizophrenia are characterized by a lack of stability in 
both the self-concept and bodily self. Beyond schizophrenia, one defining feature of borderline 
personality disorder (BPD) is “markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self” 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013); our findings suggest that these patients may also 
experience unstable bodily representations. Indeed, an unclear bodily self may explain why BPD 
patients tend to experience depersonalization (Brodsky, Cloitre, & Dulit, 1995), a feeling of 
separation between oneself and one’s body. Bodily malleability could also explain BPD 
individuals’ tendency to excessively merge with others (Beeney, Hallquist, Ellison, & Levy, 
2016). Moving away from disorders of the self-concept, a condition known to be associated with 
disturbances in the bodily self is mirror–touch synesthesia: when observing another person being 
touched, mirror–touch synesthetes experience tactile stimulation on the congruent part of their 
own body, suggesting that their bodily representations are highly malleable (Banissy & Ward, 
2007). If bodily malleability is related to an unclear and unstable cognitive self, mirror–touch 
synesthetes should also be vulnerable to self-concept confusion. Interestingly, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that mirror–touch synesthetes also have a tenuous self-concept; as one woman 
with this condition described, “I spent my life losing myself in other people, on whims, just 
gone” and “I just have no idea who I am” (Spiegel & Miller, 2015). Her comments resonate with 
research indicating that individuals low in SCC search for external sources of self-definition 
(Campbell, 1990). Given research showing that higher SCC is associated with better 
relationships (e.g., Lewandowski, Nardone, & Raines, 2009) and well-being (Campbell et al., 
1996; Treadgold, 1999), our findings imply that mirror-touch synesthetes may be prone to 
relationship difficulties and lower well-being. Future work should examine if people with one 
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kind of self disturbance—either in the self-concept or the bodily self—also experience 
disturbances in the other aspects of the self. 
A few limitations should be noted. Because the body-swap illusion is a resource-intensive 
procedure, we drew upon a larger study using this paradigm to test our hypothesis that SCC is 
associated with this bodily illusion; consequently, we could not base our sample size on the 
effect we were interested in investigating. That said, the purpose of Study 2 was to conceptually 
replicate the findings from Study 1, and to test whether the SCC–body malleability association 
extends to the entire body. Moreover, a post-hoc sensitivity analysis indicated that our sample 
size was sensitive to detecting the observed moderate- to large-sized effect of SCC in this study. 
Nonetheless, future work should replicate the association between SCC and susceptibility to the 
body-swap illusion in a larger sample to ascertain the robustness of the effect. We also did not 
have an explicit asynchronous movement condition in Study 2. However, two features of the 
body-swap paradigm we used likely attenuated the sensory conflict in the body-swap illusion. 
First, although the participants and confederate were instructed to move in synchrony in the 
body-swap paradigm, this was difficult to achieve in practice. As a result, the movements 
between participants and the confederate were likely somewhat asynchronous, similar to the 
asynchronous stimulation condition in the RHI paradigm. Second, with the exception of two 
participants, the participant and confederate were of different races, a factor known to attenuate 
degree of embodiment (Farmer et al., 2012; Lira et al., 2017). Again, though, future work should 
examine the specificity of the relationship between SCC and susceptibility to body-swapping by 
including a condition where participants are explicitly instructed to move out of synchrony with 
the confederate.  
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In conclusion, few topics are as central to human existence as the self. Questions like 
“Where does our sense of self come from?” and “How do we maintain a clear, stable, unitary 
sense of self?” have fascinated psychologists and philosophers for centuries. To answer these 
fundamental questions, some researchers have focused on the self-concept while others have 
examined the bodily self. Although traditionally investigated separately, both theory and some  
evidence suggest that these two notions of self are interrelated (Ainley et al., 2013; Banakou et 
al., 2013;  Gallagher, 2000). We add to this literature by demonstrating that low clarity, 
coherence and stability of the self-concept is associated with susceptibility to bodily illusions. 
This finding implies that a clear and coherent sense of self entails clarity and coherence in both 
the psychological and bodily notion of self, suggesting that these notions may represent two 
sides of the same self. 
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